Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine final yr reignited a longstanding debate in regards to the place the Russian opposition occupies within the context of Russian aggression within the post-Soviet area. Russian opposition activists and a few observers have contended that Russian expansionism can cease solely by regime change and democratisation, ostensibly led by the Russian opposition.

Ukrainians, and lots of of their supporters from post-Soviet international locations which have skilled Russian imperialism firsthand, are inclined to disagree. They don’t see the Russian opposition – and extra particularly its most outstanding chief at present, Alexey Navalny – as future guarantors of peace.

To elucidate why, I might first wish to relay an alternate I had with members of Navalny’s motion, or “Navalnists” as they’re referred to as in Russian, again in 2015.

It occurred at a closed occasion at a British suppose tank wherein a Ukrainian colleague of mine spoke in regards to the transformation of cultural values in Ukraine after the 2014 revolution and the start of the Russian aggression. Among the many attendees have been two Russians, who have been touring Britain as representatives of Navalny’s motion. After the discuss was achieved, my colleague and I had an opportunity to have a quick chat with them.

As one would possibly anticipate, we questioned them in regards to the remarks Navalny made on Russia’s unlawful annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in March 2014. In an interview with Echo of Moscow radio station in October 2014, Navalny admitted that the peninsula had been seized by “outrageous violations of all worldwide norms”, and but asserted that it might “stay a part of Russia” and would “by no means turn out to be a part of Ukraine within the foreseeable future”.

His assertion was not merely an evaluation of the developments round Crimea. When pressed on whether or not he would return Crimea to Ukraine have been he to turn out to be Russia’s president, Navalny wrapped his “No” in an odd rhetorical query: “What? Is Crimea a sandwich or one thing that you may take and provides again?” It was clear that his political place on Crimea was that it ought to “stay a part of Russia”.

You will need to level out that our dialog with the 2 Navalnists happened lower than half a yr after the assassination of outstanding Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov close to the Kremlin. The homicide of Nemtsov, who vocally opposed Russia’s aggression in opposition to Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, allowed Navalny to emerge as the principle Russian opposition chief nonetheless making an attempt to do politics in Russia.

The opposite main opponent of President Vladimir Putin’s regime, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, lived in exile in London and was indirectly concerned in Russian politics.

Therefore, it was not unreasonable to think about at the moment that any regime change in Russia, if it have been to occur, can be led by Navalny. That’s the reason we wished to know what Ukraine ought to anticipate from “the fantastic Russia of the long run”, as Navalny likes to name post-Putin Russia.

The Navalnists responded that below a democratically elected authorities, Moscow would hold Crimea even supposing the annexation was unlawful. That’s as a result of their insurance policies must mirror the desire of the Russian folks and the overwhelming majority of Russians wished Crimea to be inside Russian borders.

However there was extra to it. We contended that the West would by no means recognise the annexation of Crimea and that the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity wouldn’t solely enhance relations between Russia and the West however would additionally assist restore relations between Russia and Ukraine. The Navalnists’ response was that “the fantastic Russia of the long run” would discover methods to clean relations with the West with out rectifying the injustice achieved to Ukraine.

Ukraine, in different phrases, is perhaps a right away sufferer of Putin’s regime, and but – even when he’s gone – it might stay a sufferer of Russian colonialism as a result of the latter was in style not solely amongst regime supporters but additionally amongst “Russian democrats”. As Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of many central figures of the Ukrainian nationwide liberation motion in 1917-1919, insightfully famous a century in the past, “Russian democracy ends the place the Ukrainian query begins”.

As Navalny grew to become the face of the Russian opposition to Putin – a face more and more recognised as such not solely in Russia but additionally within the West – Ukrainians grew cautious. At the moment, the West backed democratisation and modernisation in Ukraine and provided some help for the nation’s wrestle in opposition to Russian aggression. “However what would turn out to be of that if Navalny have been to come back to energy in Russia?” we requested ourselves.

As Navalny positively loved, on the very least, ethical help from Western leaders, his rise to energy in Russia might conceivably result in a reset in Western-Russian relations, leaving Ukraine out within the chilly. Many feared that Ukraine would not matter to Western leaders if that they had somebody nicer than Putin to speak to.

And there was already a precedent. In August 2008, Russia – then below the management of Dmitry Medvedev – invaded Georgia and occupied the Georgian areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The West brokered a peace settlement which was not solely extremely unfavourable to Georgia however was additionally not honoured by Russia.

And but, half a yr later, the Obama administration provided Medvedev – who, at the moment, appeared extra progressive than Putin – a “reset” in an try to enhance relations between the US and Russia. This transfer which was usually welcomed by West European governments primarily meant “wiping the slate clear” and, thus, implied that Russia’s occupation of Georgian areas wouldn’t be contested.

Navalny, as Ukrainians and liberal Russians keep in mind properly, vehemently supported the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and even used derogatory, dehumanising phrases to seek advice from the Georgian folks. A number of years later, he would apologise for the phrases he used, however by no means for his help of the Russian warfare on Georgia.

Navalny was nominally in opposition to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, however his “anti-war” place was underpinned by financial, quite than ethical, concerns: “Russia can sick afford waging the warfare”. That place expectedly didn’t entail any empathy in the direction of the Ukrainian folks – one thing that was additionally mirrored in his use of ethnic slurs in opposition to them.

He noticed the Russian folks as victims of injustice below Putin’s regime, not the Ukrainians. In his view, no incorrect had been dedicated in opposition to Ukraine that was price righting.

Within the following years, because the Russian aggression in Ukraine was a frozen battle, Navalny and his workforce centered on exposing the corruption of Putin’s regime by a collection of high-profile investigations. Forward of the 2018 presidential elections, these sensational revelations began to harass the Kremlin in probably the most critical method.

Navalny and his followers have been subjected to common bodily assaults and short-term arrests. The Kremlin had clearly come to imagine that his political motion posed a risk to the regime and determined to destroy it.

It appeared to make sense for Ukrainians to supply help for Navalny’s motion, not less than tactical if not strategic, because it might probably destabilise Putin’s regime and subvert its warfare machine. However the troubles of Navalny and his followers didn’t resonate with Ukrainians, as his previous remarks, in addition to the Navalnists’ conceitedness and disdain, provided little hope that “the fantastic Russia of the long run” would have any respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Even after the Russian authorities poisoned Navalny with a nerve agent and later imprisoned him on politically-motivated prices, few Ukrainians softened their stances.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, adopted by the large crackdown on the remnants of anti-Putin opposition in Russia, dramatically modified the views on Ukraine many Russian critics of the Putin regime held, together with Navalny’s workforce.

As the vast majority of Navalnists have been compelled to hunt refuge within the West, the place many influential figures adopted a “Ukraine First” coverage in speaking with self-identified “Russian democrats”, the Navalnists might not afford to publicly specific their disdain for Ukraine as a result of they risked dropping all Western sympathy in the direction of their motion.

In late February 2023, Navalny’s workforce printed a 15-point manifesto that sought to clear a lot of the controversy round their views of Ukraine. Importantly, the manifesto acknowledged the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine, implying the necessity for the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and all different at present occupied Ukrainian territories.

The doc additionally insisted on withdrawing all Russian troops from Ukraine, providing reparations, investigating warfare crimes in cooperation with worldwide establishments, and finally letting Ukraine stay and develop as Ukrainians need.

For a lot of Ukrainians, nonetheless, this variation of coronary heart is properly previous its due date. In at present’s Ukraine, only a few imagine that the Russian aggression will be stopped by anti-Putin activism, even one that’s unambiguously pro-Ukrainian.

On this warfare, Ukrainians depend on their very own preventing spirit and Western help. What occurs to Russia after its much-anticipated navy defeat in Ukraine shouldn’t be of a lot concern. This may increasingly seem short-sighted, however the warfare is understandably a extra urgent challenge.

The views expressed on this article are the writer’s personal and don’t essentially mirror Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.