Yves right here. Galbraith critiques standard photos of inflation, the profile of our present episode, and the way it clear didn’t end result from Covid “stimulus” associated spending. This piece does a great job of creating principle accessible and explaining the way it applies to current circumstances. Nonetheless, readers might quibble with Galbraith not together with meals shortages (avian flu, provide chain interruptions, some poor harvests) in his record of inflation drivers.

By James Okay. Galbraith holds the Lloyd M. Bentsen jr. Chair in Authorities/Enterprise Relations on the Lyndon B. Johnson College of Public Affairs, and a Professorship in Authorities at The College of Texas at Austin. This essay is forthcoming within the Evaluate of Keynesian Economics and is posted right here with the permission of the editor. Contact: galbraith@mail.utexas.edu. Initially revealed at the Institute for New Financial Considering web site

1. Introduction

The phrase “unemployment” has a exact technical that means, with origins within the industrial financial system of post-Civil Battle Massachusetts (Card 2011); to be unemployed is to be in search of paid work however unable to search out it on the prevailing wage. The idea was developed for administrative functions at explicit phases of capitalist growth; it has authorized and social-welfare implications, and the phrase will not be relevant in different settings, corresponding to peasant-agrarian or casual economies.

Although usually juxtaposed with unemployment, the phrase “inflation” has a unique ontological basis. It’s a theoretical time period that has been bowdlerized in common discourse, to the purpose the place two distinguished advisers to President Biden lately superior this prosaic definition: “the speed of change in costs over time.” (Bernstein and Tedeschi 2021). So, it’s essential to differentiate between usages. We’d name these “pure inflation” and “on a regular basis inflation.”

2. Pure and On a regular basis I nflation

Pure inflation is the theoretical idea. It could be outlined because the undifferentiated devaluation of the financial unit in relation to all items and providers within the financial system, on a seamless or sustained foundation. That is the sort recognized to acolytes of Milton Friedman as being “all the time and all over the place a financial phenomenon.” (Henderson 2021) It’s hardly ever (if ever) encountered in actual life. Probably in Sixteenth-century Europe the inflow of silver and gold from the Americas and their impact on the worth of metallic financial items then in use gives an approximate instance. The trendy hyperinflations and forex collapses of (amongst others) Germany and Zimbabwe conventionally fall into the identical class, although these undoubtedly had differential results on exports, imports, and non-tradables. However against this, a single once-for-all devaluation (say, Mexico 1995) wouldn’t depend, if the nationwide cash then stabilized, and the worth shock handed by means of the home financial system inside a restricted time.

The other case, on a regular basis inflation, is of a once-for-all improve within the worth of a core commodity – a worth shock, sometimes in power – that propagates by means of the final worth construction in tough alignment with the factor-intensity of that commodity in several sectors. Within the instances of oil and pure gasoline, direct derivatives corresponding to fertilizer, plastics, and transportation could be hit arduous, extra distant sectors (corresponding to housing and providers) much less so. On this case, a rise within the normal worth degree is all the time noticed, as a result of virtually all costs of produced items and providers, and particularly wages, are sticky downward, so there’s by no means a full offset of elevated costs in a single sector by decreases in one other. Nonetheless, the web impact is all the time a shift within the distribution of incomes towards the sectors experiencing the biggest worth and revenue features, which is why inflation of this kind can’t be certified as “pure.” Additional, the shock to the final worth degree often dissipates after a sure interval – maybe usually a number of months. It could persist within the information and headlines for longer, as mentioned beneath.

Having recognized the 2 polar instances, “pure” and “on a regular basis” inflation, we might admit the opportunity of an intermediate case. This could possibly be referred to as “hybrid” or “persistent on a regular basis” inflation. It could be marked by a sequence of knock-on or ratchet results (Wooden 1978), through which relative worth impulses are handed from one sector to a different with out main damping. A construction of staggered wage contracts throughout totally different highly effective commerce unions might have this high quality, with wage after which worth will increase ricocheting from one industrial sector or public service to the following. The US and UK inflations of the Nineteen Fifties by means of the Seventies have been more-than-possibly of this kind.

With this typology in thoughts, the US worth will increase of 2021-2022 have been definitely an on a regular basis inflation. There was no collapse of the US greenback on worldwide markets, nor any normal, undifferentiated improve of all costs. There was additionally no long-term reverberation of price pressures from one sector to the following, and no proof of an ongoing wage-wage spiral. What did occur, was a collection of cost-shocks associated to the pandemic and its aftermath, briefly exacerbated by the sudden escalation in early 2022 of the Ukraine battle, which started to fade from the information over the second half of 2022.

3. Sources of On a regular basis Inflation in 2021 and 2022

A very powerful price shock was within the power sector, and particularly oil. With the onset of the pandemic, gross sales, manufacturing, exploration, and pricing within the home US oil sector all declined sharply. This created a low base for the restoration of oil costs in 2021 and into 2022, therefore a big hit to the speed of change when restoration occurred. The shock additionally meant that oil properties, notably within the Permian Basin, have been briefly low cost. Personal fairness moved in, stating overtly to the native press that their goal could be to extend the rate-of-return and “shareholder worth” – fairly than most ranges of manufacturing or financial progress. A typical report within the Houston Chronicle reads:

Buyers in oil and gasoline firms, nonetheless, have been pushing for ‘capital self-discipline’ and elevated returns. The result’s, as a substitute of spending to shortly ramp up manufacturing in oil fields such because the Permian, firms are sticking to already deliberate manufacturing will increase — offering solely modest aid to tight provides and excessive costs whereas passing on a great chunk of their blockbuster income to buyers. (Buckley 2022)

The worth of oil had fluctuated in a variety roughly from $65 to $80 per barrel (WTI, adjusted for inflation) within the years simply earlier than the pandemic. It took a spectacular dive to simply $20/bbl in early 2020, recovered to its pre-pandemic ranges, after which briefly spiked to round $116/bbl in early 2022 earlier than once more returning to $80.55 in November 2022. In inflation-adjusted phrases, the worth of oil by no means reached ranges prevailing as lately as 2014 (FRED 2022), but from the low base of early 2020 the speed of change, and subsequently the contribution of by-product fuels to the change within the shopper worth index, was dramatic. It was, nonetheless, completed by June 2022, with worth deflation setting in thereafter. Within the interim, oil costs drove the gasoline element of the Client Worth Index up by 154 p.c from the low in March 2020 to the height in June 2022, with oblique results on meals and all different sectors.

A second price shock affected cars. Right here the perpetrator was a scarcity of semiconductors, essential for brand spanking new vehicles. Within the early days of the pandemic, with a pointy decline in commuting, main semiconductor producers wager on a shift of demand towards digital home equipment and family tools, which didn’t happen. New automobile manufacturing was subsequently nicely in need of demand as 2021 got here round. The impact on new automobile costs was modest, as the primary impact in that market was backlogs and queues. Nonetheless, demand was displaced onto used vehicles, which exist in mounted provide and promote for what the market will bear. Used automobile costs rose 55 p.c to a peak in February 2022.

A 3rd important (although smaller, and significantly later) worth improve occurred within the housing element of the CPI, which accounts for about thirty p.c of the index. On this element, precise rents largely stand in for the price of housing; the thought is {that a} shift from rental to possession of a home mustn’t have an effect on its contribution to measured output. In follow, the imputation is problematic. Rental markets are decrease earnings, decrease high quality, and better turnover than sale markets, and the worth of recent leases is extra risky than rents beneath long-term contracts, that are in flip extra risky than the precise price of sustaining a house owned outright or with a hard and fast mortgage.

Thus, it’s potential that an rising worth of recent rental contracts might have an amplified impact on “imputed rents” — which owners are calculated as paying to themselves — whereas having little materials impact on the precise housing prices of most American owners. The housing element of the worth index accelerated from the summer season of 2021 by means of the autumn of 2022, at which level it too started to subside. In any occasion, as with used vehicles, the sale or rental of present houses is an inside switch, with equal features and losses on both facet of the transaction. It isn’t a relationship between “shoppers” and “producers” of a great or service. It isn’t clear why this element ought to determine closely, or in any respect, in coverage choices over “inflation.”

The problem of persistence is blurred by transmission results from the wholesale to the retail ranges. Whereas oil costs had recovered simply to beforehand regular values by March 2021 (and solely thereafter spiked briefly in March 2022), gasoline costs, which determine immediately within the CPI, continued to rise till a peak in June 2022. Is that this “persistence” – or is it merely a lagged impact, as retailers dump inventories acquired at decrease costs and exchange them with new merchandise at greater costs?

For the general worth degree, there was an additional, fateful, phantasm of persistence. The Bureau of Labor Statistics studies the change within the CPI on a 12-month foundation, evidently to keep away from the flux endemic to a month-to-month survey. This follow has the consequence of producing eleven further headlines after any one-month shock to the worth degree, every of which can include no new data no matter. Such information tales (and related opinion items) continued by means of the mid-term elections of 2022. By then, repetition had finished its job; the course of coverage was set. Afterward, it grew to become clear that there was no persistence of worth pressures within the US financial system (Smith and Duguid 2022), and that an evident turning level had already been reached by mid-summer.

4. The Phillips Curve, the NAIRU, and Inflation Concentrating on

Distinguished economists – Lawrence Summers (2021), Jason Furman (2022) – have been fast to repair the blame for the rising costs of 2021 and 2022 on macroeconomic coverage, and particularly fiscal coverage, whereas others – Kenneth Rogoff (2022), Alan Blinder (2022) – positioned the highlight (if not the blame) on the allegedly over-expansionary (or insufficiently reactive) insurance policies of the Federal Reserve. Though their interpretations differ in some respects, these views are all rooted within the historical past, as they noticed it, of the inflation of the Seventies, and within the fashions frequent to that period.

We might distinguish maybe three variants of this macroeconomic view. The primary adverts to the Phillips Curve (Samuelson and Solow 1960), which hypothesized, from restricted remark and daring conjecture, a secure tradeoff between unemployment and inflation charges. The Phillips conjecture gained credibility from rising costs and falling jobless charges by means of the Nineteen Sixties in america, however didn’t correspond to the information thereafter, and by no means did in most different industrial nations.

A second variant emerged by the hands of Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1967); they launched a hypothetical referred to as “inflation expectations” and confirmed that incorporating that idea right into a Phillips equation would generate a near-vertical long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. Thus emerged the “pure charge” or “non-accelerating inflation charge” of unemployment (NAIRU). By the lights of this mannequin, makes an attempt to cut back unemployment (beneath its “pure” worth) with demand stimulus might result in ever-accelerating inflation. In a theoretically-consequential however empirically-nonexistent gloss, Robert Lucas (1972) and others modified the expectations thought (from “adaptive” to “rational”) to provide a strictly-vertical inflation/unemployment relationship and the “hyper-neutrality” of cash. By dint of logic and within the face of the collapse of the unique Samuelson-Solow formulation, Friedman-Phelps-Lucas underpinned a brand new orthodoxy, based on which central banks ought to solely goal the inflation charge and go away unemployment to the “labor market.”

Precisely how the central financial institution ought to goal the inflation charge is a clumsy query to which no clear reply exists. The unique counter-Keynesian (monetarist) view held that the central financial institution might and will goal the expansion of the cash provide. Utility of this concept from 1979 to 1982 got here with the price of a large droop and international debt disaster; within the aftermath, the follow of cash progress targets was deserted. Since then, Federal Reserve coverage combines concentrating on of short-term rates of interest with public statements on desired inflation; the effectiveness of this technique was by no means examined within the forty years after Volcker dumped monetarism, as there was no inflation to check it on. Nor (regardless of residual monetarist fears) did “quantitative easing” within the 2000s deliver inflation again. As Hyman Minsky noticed (Marselli 1993), banks don’t lend reserves and they don’t want reserves with the intention to lend.

By 2018, the proof in opposition to the pure charge/NAIRU speculation was sturdy sufficient for Olivier Blanchard (2018) to boost some tentative questions and to recommend that economists would possibly “hold an open thoughts and put some weight on the alternate options.” There is no such thing as a signal that this clever recommendation took maintain.[1]

5. The Output-Hole Mannequin

With the demise of the unique Phillips Curve, some mainstream economists who have been unwilling to surrender a stabilizing function for macroeconomic coverage retreated to a rough-and-ready calculation of “financial slack” – the estimated distinction between precise output and its “potential” worth. The latter could possibly be calculated by projecting ahead, from the previous peak, the expansion charge of actual Gross Home Product earlier than the downturn. The underlying pondering was that as long as fiscal stimulus was restricted to an quantity estimated to be enough to shut the actual-to-potential output hole, inflation dangers have been minor and could possibly be disregarded. This view grew to become extremely influential in setting fiscal coverage.

The output-gap mannequin lends assist to the main pseudo-Keynesian prescription within the face of recessions, specifically tax cuts for households and enterprise companies mixed with direct money transfers to households. These measures, universally described as “stimulus,” have been considered the fast-acting options; contemporary cash in non-public arms could be shortly spent, bringing on probably the most fast restoration and return to excessive employment. Direct spending – public works and jobs applications – would function immediately on GDP (as tax cuts and bonus checks don’t) and with bigger multiplier results. However – the argument usually went – they might not be mobilized so shortly, when it mattered most. They might thus threat coming onstream simply because the financial restoration was full, and so including, counterproductively, to renewed inflation.

Whereas the output-gap strategy was (and to many economists nonetheless is) intuitively interesting, it rests on a number of unspoken assumptions. The primary is that slumps are primarily pushed by cycles in efficient demand, whether or not for consumption items, enterprise funding, or exports – and never by modifications within the materials circumstances underpinning manufacturing. A decline in useful resource high quality, a rise in useful resource prices, institutional failures, or a technological shift rendering amassed bodily capital out of date – these issues would preclude any early return to the earlier manufacturing peaks, and render calculations primarily based on these peaks irrelevant to the post-slump circumstances. Second, even when the calculation is right when first made, any failure to return quickly to the earlier peak manufacturing entails the decay of present capital, in order that the potential dips towards the precise as time passes. If these potentialities are acknowledged, the output-gap calculation would seem to depart even much less room for a non-inflationary pseudo-Keynesian stimulus coverage.

Additional, the quantity that appeared fascinating would rely additionally on the speed at which progress was forecast to renew within the absence of a stimulus coverage. Since commonplace fashions construct in a reversion to the earlier equilibrium path, quoi que vienne, an optimistic forecast militates for cautious estimates of how a lot “stimulus” to enact. In 2009, warning prevailed, with a “focused and non permanent” growth program together with a big tax-cut element. It proved significantly inadequate. In 2020 and 2021, very a lot bigger and extra sweeping emergency applications evoked expressions of concern from main figures of the Obama period; Summers (2021) specifically warned that it might set off an accelerating inflation as households rushed to spend their earnings features.

There may be, nonetheless, an element that cuts in the wrong way – as certainly Milton Friedman (1957) as soon as implied, in advancing the “everlasting earnings speculation” for which he was awarded the economists’ Nobel prize. Friedman argued that, previous a sure level, a big switch of buying energy to households might have an effect on stability sheets fairly than conduct. In that case, the results of fiscal stimulus could be largely restricted to the preservation of earlier spending patterns; any further transfers would merely be saved away, partly as a hedge in opposition to future in poor health fortune. Curiously, although he had expressed admiration for Friedman on factors on which he was fallacious (Summers 2006), Summers didn’t (as far as I’ve seen) consult with the everlasting earnings speculation within the debates of 2021, though it proved on this occasion to be a good information to precise occasions.

6. US Family Habits in Hunch and Stimulus

The US had a poor and badly organized public well being response to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, with a fast unfold of the virus and a chilling demise toll, albeit closely weighted towards the aged, immunocompromised, and in any other case at-risk components of the inhabitants. Nonetheless, the financial response was fast and administratively environment friendly, offering a money switch by means of the tax system and a really substantial prolonged unemployment profit, which, at $600 per week initially, represented a elevate for a big section of the working inhabitants. Because of this, regardless of a spectacular collapse in employment and dealing incomes, there was little-to-no improve in poverty and sure indicators of well-being, corresponding to meals insecurity, really declined (Schanzenbach 2022).

What did households do with the cash? For the overwhelming majority, laid-off from low-to-moderate-wage service jobs, one of the best reply (Peterson Basis 2021) seems to be that they stored up with their abnormal, mounted, and customary bills: lease, utilities, groceries, gasoline, schooling. They didn’t splurge, however for these households, there was solely a modest improve in financial savings. For households within the higher tiers of the distribution, the image is totally different. That they had beforehand spent closely on the providers that employed the massive majority of American staff; they have been much less more likely to change into unemployed and the help was a less-important share of their incomes. However they have been minimize off from the abnormal use of their earnings. In order that they saved what they might not spend, and mixture financial savings rose briefly to about one-third of mixture earnings. These financial savings then discovered their means into asset markets: actual property, company equities, collectibles, and the like, with purchases abetted by extraordinarily low long-term rates of interest. Asset costs, accordingly, recovered shortly and rose sharply because the pandemic wore on.

None of this helps the notion of an inflationary spending spree fed by a reckless “stimulus” coverage. There was, to a level, a shift of buying energy, blocked from providers, into family home equipment, autos, residence renovations, and new development. However (as institutionalist principle would predict) the results of this shift towards newly-produced items was (primarily) backlogs and queues and shortages fairly than worth will increase, and in lots of instances the backlogs have been of imports, resulting in epic congestion within the container ports of the US West Coast (USDOT 2022). Worth results have been (once more, as principle would anticipate) stronger in asset markets. As said above, these aren’t markets for produced items and subsequently not usually thought-about to be parts of inflation, even when they do seem in some elements of the Client Worth Index. Quite the opposite, the same old phrase for a normal improve in asset costs is “growth.” And booms, as historical past reveals, are deeply weak to elevated rates of interest.

Briefly abstract: The worth will increase of 2021-2022 have been cost-driven, accompanied by an asset worth growth incident to the disruption of the service financial system. They weren’t pushed by macroeconomic extra, neither fiscal nor financial. However they did hand the Federal Reserve a political drawback, which it proceeded to unravel, in what might show to be the worst means.

7. The Fed Waves Its Wand

In accordance with President Biden (Irwin 2022) and to the massive consensus of mainstream economists and the voices of the monetary sector, the “inflation” drawback of 2021-2022 fell inside the accountability of the Federal Reserve. This was handy for every participant within the drama. For the President, it meant that political accountability for worth will increase and (worse) for the results of coping with it could possibly be shuffled off onto an impregnable establishment outdoors his management. For the banks, vested by means of quantitative easing with huge extra reserves, it might imply earnings with out threat or effort, for the reason that Federal Reserve pays curiosity on reserves on the official charge. For the economists and central bankers, it might imply vindication of their long-held beliefs and a lift to their perceived affect. The prices would fall elsewhere – on different nations and their banks, on speculative markets, on homebuilders and owners, on the indebted, and, finally though not essentially quickly, on companies and the presently employed.

The Federal Reserve subsequently acted. Rates of interest rose in massive tranches from early 2022 by means of the late fall. Increased rates of interest shortly quelled the housing market, whereas supporting the greenback and subsequently protecting a lid on the worth of imports. Shares, particularly within the know-how sector, and cryptocurrencies fell in worth. By elevating rates of interest aggressively, the Federal Reserve additionally acquired credit score for an finish to cost will increase in core commodities that might have stopped rising in any occasion, particularly after the administration began promoting petroleum from the Strategic Reserve and oil costs have been introduced again down. The truth that completely no prior principle or proof helps the notion that tight financial insurance policies can finish inflation inside only a few months was, in the primary, conveniently missed (Galbraith 2022b). The Federal Reserve is a really fortunate establishment.

Nonetheless, there’s a fly within the soup. It’s the relationship between the short-term rate of interest, which the Federal Reserve controls, and the longer-term charges, on Treasury bonds and within the non-public sector, over which the central financial institution workout routines little or no fast affect. Lengthy-term charges, for a secure asset like Treasury bonds, are a compound of present short-term charges and the anticipated future course of short-term charges over the lifetime of the bond. This second ingredient has been conditioned (very moderately) for years to anticipate very low short-term charges, and thus to view an increase in charges as a brief aberration, more likely to be reversed as soon as the financial system falls right into a deep sufficient droop. The result’s that the yield curve, usually upward-sloping, is now inverted. There may be subsequently no purpose for any investor to purchase or maintain a long-term safety – the short-term belongings aren’t solely safer, but additionally a greater deal.

This is the reason an inverted yield curve is sort of all the time adopted by a droop in enterprise funding, residence development, housing costs (and subsequently the viability of mortgages), and naturally in shares and bond markets (Galbraith, Giovannoni and Russo 2007). At current writing, many observers can see the approaching storm. However the Federal Reserve is caught. If it relaxes coverage, it would seem over-sensitive to financial dangers, inconstant, and non-credible. If it continues down the current path, it’s steering financial exercise towards a cliff. Once more, not essentially quickly. However sooner or later, and inevitably – opening the door to a different monetary disaster and yet one more spherical of disaster interventions.

On this local weather, at current writing, the Federal Reserve’s management has proven its colours and commitments (Galbraith 2022a). The pursuits of the greenback and the US banking sector in world competitors are paramount. As far as the home political financial system is anxious, the precedence is primarily towards guaranteeing that wages by no means catch as much as the worth will increase which have already occurred. In current speeches (Cohan 2022), Chairman Powell has made this dedication abundantly clear – and even the truth that wage progress has slowed in current months appears to be making little impression on the course of coverage. Unemployment should rise, labor markets should soften, capital should acquire, and staff should lose. That’s the place issues presently stand.

8. The Prospect for Costs

The most certainly course of occasions is subsequently a renewed droop and an additional shock to employment and wages. Other than development, nonetheless, this will likely not occur quickly; opposite to generally expressed liberal worries (Olander, 2022), the following large one might not but be in sight. Companies and households have a means of making an attempt to outlive, when circumstances start to worsen, by taking over new money owed even on unfavorable phrases. Lenders often discover such offers engaging; they bring about good returns and the belongings, corresponding to they’re, can usually be securitized and fobbed off on the unwary. This may proceed till it stops.

And so, it additionally stays potential that the disaster of costs, such because it was, might not have run its course. There are three causes to concern further issues on the fee entrance within the interval forward.

First, there’s a drawback of gross markups. In regular instances, with normal worth stability, these are stabilized by conference and behavior, by the financial equal of fine manners. Companies are cautious about antagonizing their clients; they don’t like to amass the repute of a worth gouger. (This is the reason, as an illustration, {hardware} shops don’t usually jack up the worth of plywood when a hurricane is on the way in which). However in a normal melee, with costs going up throughout, a unique mentality units in, an impulse to seize what one can, and never be the sucker left behind. An inflation pushed by income (Bivens 2022), not wages, can subsequently reverberate for a while. Not like a wage spiral, a revenue spiral will get little media consideration and coverage response – for apparent causes.

Second, there’s a threat of extra shocks to core commodities, particularly within the power sector. Oil costs got here down in 2022 because of gross sales from a finite strategic reserve. Now with the mid-term election previous, the administration plans to purchase oil from the market to replenish the inventory (White Home 2022). Will manufacturing suffice to cowl each common demand and storage? As far as recognized, nobody actually is aware of; each the geology and the technique of the manufacturing companies and refiners are unsure. However power markets are financialized, and there’s in them the capability for speculative manipulation – what I’ve referred to as the choke-chain impact (Galbraith 2014). We will see whether or not we’re in for one more spherical of that.

Third, there’s the impact of upper rates of interest on enterprise prices. Curiosity, in spite of everything, have to be paid. In the end, the upper short-term charges will bleed into the accounts of enterprise debtors, and among the impact can be handed alongside, as far as circumstances allow, to their clients. To that diploma, a good financial coverage is inflationary earlier than it’s disinflationary.

9. Conclusion

In sum, the theoretical assemble of pure inflation is of no use in understanding the worth occasions of 2021 and 2022 in america. By extension, the traditional instruments of the Phillips Curve, NAIRU, potential output, and money-supply progress are equally ineffective. By additional extension, the “anti-inflation” insurance policies of the Federal Reserve have acted on asset markets (which aren’t a part of theoretical inflation) whereas taking credit score for the tip to a worth course of in produced items that was transitory in any occasion. But the Federal Reserve is now caught in a posture assured to destabilize financial exercise eventually, whereas the financial system stays weak to further potential worth shocks emanating from the identical sources already seen, together with actual assets, provide chains, wars, pandemics, and the insurance policies of the Federal Reserve itself. These could be handled, if in any respect, solely by insurance policies in every particular space (Weber 2021). And that, by the way in which, was very a lot a part of the pondering of John Maynard Keynes (1940) on this subject in How you can Pay for the Battle, together with the follow of his partial disciple, John Kenneth Galbraith (1952), on the Workplace of Worth Administration in 1942-1943.

Endnote

[1] Blanchard didn’t cite an article in the identical journal twenty-one years beforehand, titled with much less equivocation: “Time to Ditch the NAIRU” (Galbraith 1997).

See unique submit for references