A 12 months after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the controversy about whether or not that is President Vladimir Putin’s battle or not continues. Anti-war Russians, lots of whom have sought refuge exterior the nation, blame the Russian president. For them, his delusions and paranoia have precipitated a flip to neo-totalitarianism at dwelling and navy aggression overseas.

The Russian opposition in exile and in jail insists that if Putin is to fall from energy, the state of affairs would reverse. Leonid Volkov, the quantity two of imprisoned opposition chief Alexey Navalny, has even prompt that following the tip of the battle, the West ought to provide “a Marshall Plan” not just for Ukraine, in dire want of reconstruction, but in addition for Russia.

In different phrases, opposition-minded Russians hope that Moscow will rebuild bridges with Europe and the US as soon as Putin is not on the throne.

Understandably, the notion of “Putin’s battle” has subsequent to no buy in Ukraine itself. By and enormous, Ukrainians fault Russia as a rustic and as a society, whether or not it’s the jingoistic cheerleaders for Moscow’s “particular navy operation” or the silent majority who select to easily ignore it and get on with their every day lives.

Why ought to Russia be trusted to behave in another way sooner or later, they ask, provided that Putin speaks for a nation with an imperial mindset?

Apart from, a successor to the 70-year-old chief is unlikely to return from the pro-Western opposition or be any completely different from the present occupant of the Kremlin. Among the names pundits speculate about – say the top of Russia’s Safety Council, Nikolay Patrushev – are no less than as hawkish as Putin. So for Ukrainians, Russia must be defeated, regardless of who runs the present in Moscow.

However what concerning the European Union? Has the battle moved its relations with Russia – cultivated so fastidiously for therefore lengthy – previous some extent of no return?

For Poland and the Baltic States that may be very a lot the case. For a 12 months now, they’ve had their “instructed you so” second. Even earlier than the Russian invasion final 12 months and the occupation of Crimea in 2014, they made the case that Russian revanchism poses a elementary risk to the post-Chilly Battle order in Europe.

To the west, France and Germany, nonetheless, have been rather more ambiguous of their strategy to relations with Russia. From the second he first assumed workplace in 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron has been making a case that Europe ought to take into consideration the long run and interact the Russians. Macron caught to this line just about till the invasion and stored calling Putin within the hope of understanding a diplomatic resolution of some kind. And as just lately as final December, the French president spoke of “safety ensures” to Russia that ought to be a part of a settlement.

Germany has elicited much more frustration and ire amongst Jap European associates of Ukraine. Lengthy years of cosying as much as the Russians and enterprise cum political ventures, such because the Nord Stream gasoline pipeline, have tainted its document. The German political class has lengthy seen Russia as a pal and a few, like former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, landed profitable gigs with Moscow’s state-run vitality firms.

Up to now 12 months, there was some change in motion and rhetoric. Within the wake of the invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared the so-called Zeitenwende (historic turning level), the concept that Berlin will lastly take European defence severely and put its weight behind it each financially and politically. His place has discovered help among the many German public, the vast majority of which is pro-Ukraine, too.

Nevertheless, the German bias in direction of hugging intently Russia, within the expectation that denser ties yield larger safety and predictability, has not been relegated to the previous. With Scholz dragging his toes on offering navy help to Ukraine, notably on the Leopard tanks, he’s signalling that the German management has not given up on Moscow altogether. In Germany’s logic, Russia will at all times be there, whether or not we prefer it or not, and we can’t merely shut it down, construct a fence round it or ignore it.

In fact, a extra charitable interpretation of the tank tussle is that Scholz’s gambit geared toward committing the US to European safety, with the 2024 US presidential elections looming on the horizon. Besides, it’s secure to imagine the Germans won’t be within the avant garde of the “cease Russia” coalition going ahead.

So then does the shortage of full alignment on Russia imply that the EU is leaving the door open for normalisation of relations in the long run? Not precisely.

The battle could and possibly will final years. As long as there’s combating, it’s exhausting to envisage any type of productive diplomatic engagement, not to mention rekindling political and financial hyperlinks. Actually, till Putin is in workplace relations will likely be confrontational.

In case of de-escalation, a brand new line will likely be drawn throughout Jap Europe leaving Ukraine and probably Moldova and Georgia on the “Western aspect”, Belarus on Russia’s, and Armenia and Azerbaijan in no-man’s land. A Chilly Battle-like situation will materialise, with the pro-Western international locations drawn into EU and NATO’s orbit and Russia entrenching itself in no matter elements of Ukraine it’d succeed to maintain.

This additionally implies that Chilly Battle-style diplomacy will likely be deployed. The EU – and its ally, the US – will interact with Russia solely so as to protect stability and keep away from a full-frontal collision. The essence of Western coverage will likely be containment, not integration as was the case within the Nineteen Nineties and 2000s.

The battle has taken a heavy toll on financial hyperlinks between Russia and the EU and Putin’s coverage selections have accelerated forces that any future chief would possibly battle to reverse. Moscow was once one of many most important vitality suppliers to the union; it’s no extra and is unlikely to get better its place. The Russian share of the European gasoline imports has gone down from 50 p.c in 2021 to a meagre 12.9 p.c at current.

The European sanctions have pressured Russia to gravitate in direction of China and to some extent, the World South. This will likely be one of many battle’s lasting legacies.

Anti-Putin Russians hope that their nation could ultimately discover its method again to the West. European leaders are proper to suppose lengthy and exhausting about what comes after the combating stops – as ultimately it would. But, as historical past reveals, wars are transformative occasions. For higher or worse, the clock won’t flip again to February 23, 2022.

The views expressed on this article are the creator’s personal and don’t essentially mirror Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.